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Subscriptions help us deliver original coverage of the region's most important issues.Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani is the supreme religious authority in the eyes of millions of Shiite Muslims in Iraq and beyond. Following the 2003 US-led invasion, he emerged as the single most influential voice in Iraqi society, and has over the years helped steer the country through multiple crises. In 2005, he guided his followers to support the new constitution.
And amid the chaos that followed the Islamic State group’s (IS) 2014 blitz in northern Iraq, it was an edict (fatwa) issued by the supreme Shiite religious authority which motivated tens of thousands of Iraqis to take up arms.
The Iranian wall against Iran
Sistani’s paramount status and influence are primarily derived from his leadership of the Najaf-based Marjaiya, a centuries-old Shiite collegial institution that brings together top religious scholars.
The advanced age of Sistani has many in Iraq increasingly concerned about the consequences of his eventual passing. At 91 years old, he has been the supreme Shiite religious authority since 1993. The question of what may unfold in Sistani’s absence is a chief concern for the seminary of Najaf, the center of Shiite learning in the country. This is because whoever succeeds him is certain to greatly impact Iraq, the region, and the wider Shiite world.
Sistani is broadly viewed as an impenetrable wall against the expansion of the influence of the Guardianship of the Jurist, the basis for Iran’s theocratic political system since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. This preoccupation with Iraq’s sovereignty is unshaken by the fact that the top cleric is Iranian-born and has declined invitations to apply for an Iraqi passport.
Sistani’s demise would see the Iranian state use its influence to back a successor who is closer to its vision of the role of Islam in politics. At the same time, the post-Sistani era will see other political forces—most notably Iraqi Shiite cleric and politician Muqtada Al-Sadr—vie for greater influence. Almost half his age and while there are some who say he holds a lower scholarly rank, Sadr has long sought to compete with Sistani, following in the footsteps of his late father—the prominent Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Muhammad-Sadiq Al-Sadr (1943-99).
The matter of who will succeed Sistani will therefore ultimately be decided by the competing interests of the Sadrist Movement, Iran, and Sistani’s network of supporters.
Sadr’s position in the political landscape
Grand ayatollahs do not customarily name their successors. The process of becoming a marja—a ‘religious reference’—is not hereditary and requires building a large network of support among other clerics and the devout. Leadership successions in Najaf have traditionally taken anywhere from months to several years as they require consensus to be formed among the Shiite clerical establishment, which operates on a collegial basis.
Sistani became a marja one year after the 1992 passing of his predecessor and instructor, Grand Ayatollah Abu Al-Qasim Khoei. In the interim, Grand Ayatollah Abd Al-A’la Sabziwari served as head of the Marjaiya, between 1992 and 1993.
Sistani’s main competitor at the time was Sadr’s father, who like his son today advocated for the Marjaiya to be headed by an Arab cleric. Khoei, Sabziwari and Sistani were all born in Iran and of Iranian descent. Another point of divergence pertained to the level of clerical political activism endorsed by either camp. While Khoei mostly adopted political quietism, the elder Sadr was an ardent opponent of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein and was assassinated in 1999 during his rule.
The head of the Sadrist Movement has inherited his father’s social support base and over the years developed the most formidable political apparatus in Iraq. 47-year-old Sadr is now thus strongly positioned to influence Sistani’s succession.
The Sadrist Movement today controls the single largest parliamentary bloc. It came out on top in Iraq’s latest legislative elections held in Oct. 2021, securing 73 out of the Iraqi parliament’s 329 seats. This has given Sadr decisive influence over the pending formation of the next government. The Shiite leader also heads an armed group called Saraya Al-Salam, which controls the northern Iraqi city of Samarra and is responsible for the protection of the Shiite religious shrines located there. A 2006 bombing of the shrines sparked a sectarian war in Iraq.
Importantly, Sadr has taken on different faces since the US-led invasion in 2003. He initially supported attacks on US troops by his Mahdi Army, and then left for self-imposed exile in Iran for several years. He has more recently reached out to wealthy Gulf Arab states to deepen ties to the Sunni world. All the while, however, he has portrayed himself as an Iraqi nationalist.
Mindful of his experiences under Saddam’s rule and the US occupation, Sadr believes he is entitled to be the leader of Iraq’s Shiites—both politically and religiously. He consistently emphasizes the “Iraqiness” of his political ambitions regularly and asserts that he does not follow Iran, as he claims other rival Iraqi politicians do. Yet, Sadr has also been accused of creating a rift within the Shiite political class. This diversity of reactions to his stances are an important phenomenon to consider, particularly as they are part of his movement’s appeal.
Sadr’s lofty ambitions
Sadr’s ambitions have been apparent in the actions of some of his senior supporters. For example, on Feb. 3, Hazem Al-Araji—a senior Sadrist—appeared in a video clip surrounded by a group of party loyalists and exclaimed: “From the city of Kadhimiya, we say that in Iraq there is one city that has the right to issue political and Sharia-related decisions: that city is Najaf, and in Najaf there is a small town called Al-Hannana which is the decision-maker.”
The Sadrists surrounding Araji then chanted in unison: “Hannana is the decision maker, our decision is an Iraqi decision!”
Hannana is the seat of Sadr’s headquarters, and where he often receives visiting political delegations. Even as Araji later said he was reprimanded by the head of his movement for the video and apologized to the Shiite religious establishment, the video demonstrates the Sadrist desire to control the seminary in the post-Sistani era.
Another sign of Sadr’s ambitions for the Najaf seminary emerged in late October, when he announced that he would pay stipends to seminary students in the holy city who lack financial support from other sources. Funding stipends for budding clerics is an important way for more senior clergymen to gain the popularity and support necessary to become a marja.
Sadr has also gained greater political control of Najaf. Former governor Luay Al-Yasseri resigned on Dec. 24 last year after facing protests he portrayed as "politicized and financed.” While Yasseri did not declare the alleged source of funding for his opponents, it is no secret that Sadr wanted him out. Less than three weeks later, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi appointed former Sadrist MP Majid Al-Waeli as the new governor of Najaf.
Where Sadr still lacks influence in Iraq are the religious shrines. These are not mere physical structures, but institutions which control major financial resources and investments, reaching in the hundreds of millions of dollars. In this context, Sadr recently made an overt display of his desire to control the country’s Shiite shrines.
On Feb. 13, he traveled to the holy city of Karbala to visit the shrines of Hussein ibn Ali—a grandson of Prophet Muhammad and the third Shiite Imam—and his half-brother Abbas ibn Ali. Sadr arrived in a motorcade consisting of over a dozen Toyota Land Cruiser SUVs which drove right up to the barricades directly adjacent to the shrine. The display was unprecedented for an Iraqi political leader and sent a clear message about his desire to gain influence over the massive shrine complex, which draws millions of pilgrims every year.
It is impossible to predict with full certainty what will happen in Iraq after Sistani’s passing. But given the current trajectories, one thing is for certain: Sadr could have the name, weapons, political weight, and popular support to cement his control over Najaf—and by extension, all of Iraq.