May. 22, 2024

Amid Gaza war, will Iraqi ‘resistance’ draw Jordan into confrontation?

Iraq/Security
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Amid growing tension stemming from Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, fears are rising that Jordan will be increasingly drawn into the conflict’s complex regional dynamics. The Hashemite kingdom is a long-standing ally of the United States, and has observed a peace treaty with Israel—Iran’s arch-rival—for three decades. These ties have put Jordan in the crosshairs of Iran-backed ‘resistance’ groups in Iraq who have sought to pressure Amman over its perceived tacit support for Tel Aviv’s war effort.

As the Gaza war erupted in Oct. 2023, over 800 Iraqi protesters—allegedly associated with the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Units (PMU)—gathered at the Turaibil border crossing between Iraq and Jordan. The Iraqis called for an end to Israel’s offensive in Gaza, and demanded access to Palestinian territories through the Hashemite kingdom—ultimately blocking almost three dozen oil trucks from entering Jordan.

The targeting of the trucks was significant. In response to signals of rapprochement between Amman and Baghdad, Iran’s armed allies in Iraq have in recent years sought to stymie moves to integrate the flow of oil between the two neighbors. This may signal a growing political divide between Iraq’s ruling Shiite Coordination Framework, and the armed groups that helped put the Muhammad Shia’ Al-Sudani administration in power.

In a notable escalation, on Jan. 28 this year, a lethal drone strike hit a joint Jordanian-US military base known as Tower 22 in the Hashemite kingdom’s north-east. The strike on the secretive site, reportedly utilized by American troops for operations in Syria, resulted in three US military fatalities and 40 wounded personnel. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by a new entity calling itself the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq,” believed to gather several Iran-backed Shiite armed groups.

The attack and its aftermath have raised fears that further escalation could result in Jordan’s destabilization, which many regional actors—including Iran—are likely keen to avoid given the unpredictable outcomes.

 

War by other means

Friendly relations between Amman and Baghdad under former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein (1979-2003)—including preferential energy and trade deals—soured after the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. In a 2006 accord, seen by observers as an attempt to mend ties, Iraq agreed to supply Jordan with approximately 10,000 barrels of crude per day, or 10% of its oil needs, at a discounted rate. However, the scheme has suffered from frequent interruptions, and most recently expired this month.

In early February, only days after the Tower 22 incident, independent MP Mustafa Jabar Sanad—seen as close to Iraqi ‘resistance’ groups—gathered 50 signatures from fellow lawmakers to halt the deal’s renewal. The parliamentarian justified the move by claiming that Amman had participated in Washington’s retaliatory strikes in Iraqi territory for the Jan. 28 attack in Jordan.


While Sanad’s campaign lost momentum, Jordan’s downing of Iranian Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) over its territory during Tehran’s Apr. 14 attack on Israel revived efforts in Baghdad to undermine oil trade with Amman. Observers have suggested that Iran may be coordinating with its Iraqi allies to stymie crude supplies in retaliation for Jordan’s interception of drones headed towards Israel.

Outside of conflicts over the bilateral oil deal, sabre-rattling by Iran-backed armed groups against Jordan has continued to mount in the wake of ongoing regional escalation. Amid large pro-Palestinian protests in Amman, the spokesman of Iraq’s Kata’ib Hezbollah, Abu Ali Al-Askari, issued a statement stating that the group was prepared to arm upwards of 12,000 fighters of the “Islamic Resistance” in Jordan.

The following month, Jordanian authorities seized a weapons cache that they claimed had been smuggled into the country via Syria. A report in western media quoted Jordanian security sources as claiming that a “state-sponsored militia” associated with Iran was responsible, and that the seized arms were intended for Jordan’s allegedly Iran-associated Muslim Brotherhood—claims the latter vehemently denied.

More broadly, Iran and its allies in Iraq are concerned that increased integration between Amman and Baghdad could lead to Iraq's de facto economic normalization with Israel. Jordan serves as the sole conduit for the land bridge that ties the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with Israel, a project reportedly run by the Israeli company Trucknet.

Trucknet’s profile has been raised in recent months as it bypasses the Red Sea, thereby avoiding maritime attacks on Israel-affiliated shipping by Yemen’s Ansarullah movement, better known as the Houthis. Signalling the widening scope of Iran-backed groups in the region, the Bahraini Al-Ashtar Brigades allegedly targeted Trucknet’s Eilat headquarters with a UAV on Apr. 27. According to one assessment, Kata'ib Hezbollah likely played a significant role in executing the reported attack on southern Israel.

 

Iraq’s ‘Shiite House’ divided

Despite the tough line on Jordan adopted by some Iraqi ‘resistance’ groups, prominent figures associated with the Shiite Coordination Framework have in recent years cultivated closer relations with Amman. In Sept. 2021, a Jordanian delegation held talks with prominent Shiite political figures in Baghdad, including Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq leader Qais Al-Khazali and former Iraqi prime minister Nouri Al-Maliki (2006–14).

A second Jordanian delegation arrived in the Iraqi capital in Jan. 2023 for high-level talks, including a session with Prime Minister Sudani. The agenda was topped by the revival of a proposal for a 1,700 km (1,056 miles) crude oil pipeline joining Iraq’s southern city of Basra to the Red sea port of Aqaba. Despite backing from prominent Iran-allied members of the Shiite Coordination Framework, the project quickly came under fire from other factions also seen as close to Tehran.


At issue are accusations that the Basra-Aqaba pipeline scheme will be used as a means for Iraqi oil to reach Israeli markets, not to mention that reliance on the Iran-controlled Strait of Hormuz will be reduced. Ali Al-Asadi, head of Harakat Hezbollah Al-Nujaba’s Political Council, issued a strongly worded statement rejecting the endeavor, charging that his group would resist any further attempt by the Iraqi government to develop the pipeline.

However, Haidar Al-Lami—another member of Harakat Hezbollah Al-Nujaba’s Political Council—told Amwaj.media that while his group “disagrees with the orientation of the Jordanian government,” it does not “have any form of security, military, or social strategy in Jordan.” Lami further warned that an Israeli onslaught in the southern Gaza town of Rafah could trigger a further escalation against US bases, which he accused of stoking “regional insecurity.”

Critically, prominent ‘resistance’ groups and their allies in the Iraqi government also diverge on security-related matters at home. While Sudani has pledged to end the presence of the US-led Coalition, he has so far rebuffed a push by ‘resistance’ groups to do so immediately. Ultimately, Iraq-Jordan negotiations over the Basra-Aqaba pipeline, and the extension of their bilateral oil deal, may serve as indicators of how aligned Iran’s allies in Iraq really are on broader issues of common concern.

Unlike their past escalations against Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iran’s armed allies in Iraq have so far refrained from targeting Jordan’s major population centers and energy facilities. A shift away from the status quo would likely have profound implications given Jordan’s growing role in regional energy dynamics.

Despite its reliance on imports for its oil and natural gas needs, the Hashemite kingdom is quickly becoming a central component of the region’s energy infrastructure. Amid the ongoing integration of Iraq’s western Al-Anbar Governorate into Jordan’s electrical grid, any disruption in the latter’s energy sector would have a knock-on effect on the Sudani administration’s promises to improve basic services. Given these interconnected realities, policymakers in the region will likely seek to ensure that Jordan retains its current relative stability—despite the ongoing grievances and tensions.

Tamer Badawi
Tamer Badawi
Tamer Badawi
Tamer Badawi is an independent analyst currently focused on violent conflict, governance, and geopolitics in Iraq ... Full Bio
فارسیPersian
فارسیPersian
عربيArabic
عربيArabic