The Gaza war has over the past year expanded to include Israeli attacks on Iranian and Syrian territory, and on Iran-allied Hezbollah in Lebanon. In recent months, this has raised significant concerns that a potential wider conflict could extend to Iraq—particularly since the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq”, an umbrella entity aligned with the Tehran-led ‘Axis of Resistance’, has claimed numerous strikes on Israel.

These concerns ballooned following reports in Oct. 2024 of a drone attack on a military base in the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights. The strike reportedly resulted in the deaths of four Israeli soldiers and wounded dozens of others. While Iraqi Shiite armed factions immediately denied responsibility for the incident, Israel nevertheless vowed direct retaliation which has yet to materialize.

Iraq’s political elite has been divided on how to respond to such threats, especially following Israel’s strike on military sites in Iran only weeks after the attack in the Golan Heights. While some in the administration of Prime Minister Muhammad Shia’ Al-Sudani adopted a hawkish position, expressing a readiness to confront Israel directly in the event of an assault, reports suggest that a tenuous consensus was reached to limit Iraq’s exposure to the fray. That consensus seemingly remains in place.

Adding to the complexity, Sudani’s struggle to effectively reign in Shiite armed factions, many of which enjoy formal integration into Iraq’s armed forces as members of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), indicates the potential limitations of political and diplomatic interventions to address a renewed flareup of regional tensions.

Between the domestic and the regional arenas

Speaking on condition of anonymity, a source close to the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Office told Amwaj.media that the widening of the regional crisis over the past year divided Iraq’s political elite into two camps. One camp, comprising Shiite political forces aligned with the ‘Axis of Resistance’, has aimed to forcefully confront Israel by any means available. On the other hand, predominantly Kurdish and Sunni Arab parties—as well as some Shiite Arab politicians outside of the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework—have argued that Iraq has little to do with the Iran-Israel conflict, and that Tehran and Tel Aviv should leave Baghdad out of their dispute.

Despite these divisions, all parties recognize that a potential broadening of regional conflict could drag in all parties. In the aftermath of the Oct. 2024 incident in the Golan Heights, Iraqi factions reportedly vacated their positions in Camp Saqr south of Baghdad following threats that a strike from Israel was imminent. Preferring that his name be withheld, a member of Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada told Amwaj.media that Shiite armed groups had been advised by Iraqi government officials to leave the camp to avoid potential collateral harm to Iraqi Army forces stationed there.

Also speaking on condition of anonymity, a deputy commander of Harakat Hezbollah Al-Nujaba alleged that Tehran instructed its Iraqi allies to limit their military activities as events unfolded. The source further charged that Iraqi factions in return warned Iranian counterparts that if both they and Iran were attacked simultaneously by Israel or the US, they would unilaterally strike targets across the region—including Gulf Arab states.

In this vein, Abu Ala Al-Walai, head of Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada, in a Sept. 2024 statement notably threatened Abu Dhabi. The missive stated that Iraq’s “resistance” considers the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as an effective forward operating base “of the Zionist entity in the Gulf." In the event of a broadening of armed conflict, Iran-backed factions would also likely strike Saudi Arabia given the ongoing conflict in Yemen.

The dynamics of how such a broadening of the conflict may play out depend in large part on geographical considerations. Unlike Lebanon, Iraq does not share a border with Israel—increasing the likelihood that any direct Israeli attack would involve a drone or missile barrage, rather than ground operations. Such strikes would likely target locations identified through satellite surveillance, or intelligence sharing with the US which is active in Iraq and has, according to some reports, previously guided strikes against Iraqi armed groups.

Washington’s positioning

Under the Joe Biden administration, power brokers in Washington were aiming to strike an uneasy balancing act between their stalwart material and diplomatic support for Israel while also containing broader regional conflict. The previous US government was also keenly aware that any Israeli attack on Iraqi armed groups could provoke further retaliation against American interests in Iraq.

Much of this diplomacy appeared to be happening behind closed doors. For instance, some reports alleged that then-US national security advisor Jake Sullivan warned Israel that Washington expects prior warning ahead of any military action against Iran or its regional allies. Although unconfirmed, reports suggest that precisely such a warning was given to US officials prior to Israel’s Oct. 2024 strike on Iran, information that was allegedly then passed on to Tehran.

In the aftermath of the Israeli attack on targets inside Iran, Biden in early Nov. 2024 reportedly warned the Iraqi government that if Shiite armed groups were to retaliate, they could expect a direct response from Tel Aviv. He is also reported to have told Sudani, “We will not be able to stop Israel from striking Iraq.” Of further note, the Israeli strike on Iran was allegedly carried out from Iraqi airspace—deeply embarrassing both the Iraqi government and Iran-backed armed groups, neither of which possess the military capabilities to stymie what officials in Baghdad termed the “violation” of Iraqi sovereignty.

Ultimately—then, as now—Washington is also likely aware that any Israeli attack could elevate, rather than worsen, public perceptions of Iraqi armed factions in the broader Arab world. Iraqi Shiite armed groups have reportedly seen their popularity rise following the eruption of the Gaza war due to their perceived principled stance against Israeli actions.

Looking ahead

Given the current state of play in the region, it seems unlikely that Israel will launch large-scale attacks against Iraqi armed factions in the near future. Instead, if tensions were to reignite, Tel Aviv may opt for more limited actions, such as targeted assassinations or potentially precision strikes against individuals. This more limited engagement would allow Israel to maintain face without directly triggering a costly and unpredictable war that could engulf the wider region.

Nevertheless, even such limited action still carries risks of further escalation across multiple fronts, including further engagement by Iraq’s informal union of Shiite armed groups. Ultimately, the strength of their “resistance” alliance lies less in the capability to directly confront Israel militarily. Rather, it largely depends on their ability to target energy assets, particularly those supplying the world’s oil and natural gas markets.

Given these potential risks to the global economy, Iran’s regional allies may recognize the potential opportunities found in the status quo. In the medium term, this means all parties are likely aiming to secure diplomatic concessions in exchange for limiting their military actions.