How Iran views Arab normalization with Syria

Emirati Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan (AbZ) on Nov. 9 paid an unannounced visit to Syria to meet with President Bashar Al-Assad. The trip was interpreted as another sign that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and many in the Arab world are determined to normalize relations with the Syrian government, as well as proof of Abu Dhabi’s particular interest in normalization with Damascus. That said, AbZ’s visit was the latest—albeit perhaps the most significant—of a series of contacts that have recently taken place between Syria and other Arab states. Alongside the UAE, Jordan and Egypt have also recently taken steps to mend ties with the Assad government.

Abu Dhabi first signaled its interest in restoring ties with Damascus in 2018 after reopening its embassy. Since then, some have argued that a core objective of emerging Arab normalization efforts with Assad has been to curb Iran’s growing influence in Syria. With this, the Emirati foreign minister’s visit to Syria has once again sparked speculations on the future of Tehran-Damascus relations. While some Emirati experts stress that UAE-Syria normalization will have immediate impacts on Iran’s role in Syria, some Iranian observers also highlight that Iran’s interests might become compromised.

Iran’s view of normalization

Iran’s official reaction to the UAE’s diplomatic overture to Syria was positive. In a phone conversation with AbZ on Nov. 9, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian welcomed his Emirati counterpart’s visit to Damascus, calling it a “positive step.” On the same day, Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh argued that Syria and Arab states share an interest in improving relations, stressing that “reviving Syria’s presence in the region will lead to regional growth and dynamism.” Referring to US criticism of the Emirati overture to Assad, Khatibzadeh also described the American reaction as “natural,” as the development “will have unpleasant consequences for Washington, including the failure of evil goals” and the “Zionist regime’s” plots to create sedition and isolate Arab countries.

This statement’s latter aspect helps to understand Tehran’s position on Arab normalization with Syria. From the Islamic Republic’s point of view, this process, which was not initiated by Assad but rather by the same Arab leaders who attempted to overthrow him, indicates the victory of the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance”’ over the “Hebrew-Arabic-western axis.” From this perspective, by “resisting” hostile conspiracies, the Syrian government has won the war waged by external actors. As such, Arab states taking the initiative to normalize relations with Assad is a sign of their defeat. Notably, Iran views Assad’s “victory” as a sign of the rightfulness of “resistance” discourse, which it has developed, promoted and led. The fact that Arab normalization with Syria is taking place shortly after Washington’s hasty and chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan allows Iran to speak with increased confidence regarding the failure of western policies across the region. Thus, from an ideological point of view, Tehran sees Arab normalization with Syria as a clear sign of victory.

Can competition in Syria hurt Iran?

From a political point of view, however, the situation is more complicated. Since 2017, Iran has shown interest in international diplomatic initiatives related to Syria, first by co-founding the Astana format with Turkey and Russia and then by participating in talks on the Syrian Constitutional Committee. Tehran’s main goal is to consolidate its influence in Syria by maintaining the rule of Assad, who is Iran’s safest bet to ensure its long-term influence in the country. That said, Iranian leaders understand that military victories alone will not ensure that Assad remains in power. Instead, this will require efforts to restore the Syrian government’s legitimacy. In this context, Arab normalization with Damascus can contribute to this objective.

Ironically, this same trend could simultaneously increase Assad’s options for maneuvering against his traditional allies, such as Iran and Russia. The Syrian leader could choose to build upon the UAE and Israel’s ever-expanding ties to seek an agreement with the Israelis on the occupied Golan Heights in exchange for some concessions on Iran’s role in Syria. There are already reports that Assad is behind the dismissal of a senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander in Syria. It is difficult to make a direct connection between this specific development and AbZ’s visit to Damascus—mindful that the decision was reportedly made in the preceding weeks—but there is little doubt that Assad feels more autonomy, which will only intensify over time.

Still, speculation that Arab normalization with Damascus could stifle Iran’s influence in Syria seems exaggerated. In the worst-case scenario for the Islamic Republic, its influence will be higher than the pre-2011 period. Since entering the Syrian crisis a decade ago, Iran has established a network of loyal allies in the Syrian army and security services. Tehran is also building social support networks across Syria, especially in eastern areas bordering Iraq, by offering financial incentives and through ideological propaganda. The most likely long-run scenario is thus that Assad, after consolidating power, will play Iran, Russia and Arab states against each other to serve his interests.

Finally, improved Arab-Syria relations may also have economic implications for Iran, which will cause Tehran the most problems. Since 2018, as major military clashes have subsided, Iran has sought to become active in the Syrian economy. The Islamic Republic's main goal is to further enhance its influence by participating in the country’s post-war economic reconstruction while simultaneously gaining financially to relieve its ailing domestic economy. Iranian officials have spoken frequently about the need to recoup the billions of dollars that Iran has spent in Syria.

However, economic agreements signed between Tehran and Damascus over the past three years remain mostly on paper, and Iran has failed to redefine its role in Syria from a security and military actor to an economic one. This stems from Iran’s limited financial resources due to crippling US sanctions. Under these circumstances, the UAE’s entry as a regional economic giant into the Syrian market will push Iran further to the sideline, considering actions like  Abu Dhabi’s promise to build a solar plant near Damascus. As such, when it comes to economic rather than political or security interests, Iran could be the most immediate loser of Arab normalization with Syria.