Dec. 5, 2023

Inside story: Iranian-Saudi dialogue elevated, but few expect investment

Peninsula/Diplomacy
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Following the slow progress since their China-mediated agreement in March to normalize ties, Iran and Saudi Arabia are elevating their engagement. On Nov. 11, President Ebrahim Raisi and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (MbS) met for the first time. The session was held in Riyadh, on the sidelines of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) summit on Gaza. Only weeks later, on Nov. 30, the Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces directly engaged with the Saudi defense minister via telephone.

The stepped-up dialogue notably comes amid the Hamas-Israel war. Already, reports have emerged that the Kingdom has offered investment if the Islamic Republic stops its regional allies from expanding the Gaza war. But Arab, Iranian, and Saudi sources with knowledge of the engagement between Riyadh and Tehran have questioned whether a new offer of investment has been made—particularly since Hamas’s Oct. 7 surprise attack on Israel.

Informed observers charge that Iran is unlikely to put aside greater strategic objectives for shorter-term material interests. There are also doubts that the Islamic Republic would expose itself to the risks involved in pushing its regional alliance network to strictly adopt a certain policy. These risks, experts privately note, include the possibility that partners may simply pursue their own interests.

 

Questions about Saudi investment

Two months into the fighting, the Gaza war has had important geopolitical ramifications for Iran and Saudi Arabia. The conflict has paused the US-backed effort to normalize ties between Riyadh and Tel Aviv. It has also led Yemen’s Ansarullah movement, better known as the Houthis, to target southern Israel and Israeli-linked shipping. The latter has put the Houthis on a collision course with the US, potentially threatening the group’s UN-mediated ceasefire with the Kingdom. A resumption of the Saudi-led war in Yemen could in turn put the Iranian-Saudi rapprochement at risk, with unpredictable consequences.

In this context, the recent high-level engagement between Iranian and Saudi officials is notable. Yet, there are few indications that it will result in imminent substantive action.

“It is not true,” a Saudi political insider familiar with the Kingdom’s thinking on Iran insisted when addressing whether MbS has made any new pledges of investment. However, the source added, “As relations improve, all possibilities of trade and investment open up.” The insider spoke on condition that his name be withheld given the sensitivity of the matter.

A separate Arab source with detailed knowledge of the Iranian-Saudi dialogue was more circumspect in his characterization of recent events. The source told Amwaj.media, “It is an old offer initiated first to end the Yemen war, during the [Iranian-Saudi] talks in 2021 and 2022. They probably renewed it again.” He also questioned the reported manner in which the Kingdom has made the alleged offer. “I don't think they delivered the message in this way. This is not their language,” he said, “And I don't think Saudi investment in Iran is possible in the near future due to several obstacles, and not all related to the sanctions.” In the view of the Arab source, “Iran's infrastructure is not prepared for foreign investment. Not only the Saudis but any other foreign parties are unable to work on a large scale in Iran.”

Multiple Iranian sources who spoke to Amwaj.media denied any knowledge of Saudi Arabia having put forward a significant new offer. One senior political source in Tehran expressed clear doubts about such reports, saying, “Investment has its [own] rules and it can’t be just as a result of a political or security compromise.” Pointing to external factors beyond the control of Iran and Saudi Arabia, he concluded, “Since there are sanctions, no one can promise and guarantee investment, especially the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] states which have strong economic ties with the US.”

 

Lagging economic dividends

There is little dispute that the Iranian-Saudi rapprochement has partly been driven by—and relies on—economic considerations. To pursue his Vision 2030 diversification program, MbS needs peace and stability at home. That is unlikely to materialize without an end to the Saudi-led war in Yemen. Since Iran has been backing the Houthis in that conflict, both politically and via reported deliveries of drone and missile components and technology, there is an expectation that Tehran will help support the Yemen peace process.

Furthermore, as both Arab and Iranian sources made clear to Amwaj.media, one key obstacle to Saudi investment is the tough western sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic. The complexity of this dimension has continuously expanded since Iran and Saudi Arabia began their dialogue in 2021. Beyond the nuclear issue, European governments and the US now also target Iran over its drone transfers to Russia as well as deadly crackdown on anti-establishment protests last year.

Mindful of the external constraints, there have at least so far been no signs that the Kingdom is pressing its western allies to enable investment and trade with Iran. As one Saudi source told Amwaj.media in August, Saudi Arabia has told both its “western friends” and Iran that for “this de-escalation to work we need a resolution [to the nuclear issue],” adding that “Saudi Arabia is not seeking any [sanctions] exemption.”

With the lagging progress on the nuclear issue, Iranian experts and officials are aware that a sudden inflow of Saudi investment is unlikely—even as Tehran has expressed its desire to “consolidate the economic element in bilateral relations.” The size of that “economic element” appears modest; Iran has stated that it expects annual trade with the Kingdom to reach 1B USD, with some Iranian observers questioning whether even that target is attainable.

A dynamic in which anticipated economic and security dividends may not materialize adds pressure on both sides to exhibit other tangible outcomes of their rapprochement.

 

Momentum on engagement

On Jan. 2, 2016—two weeks before the implementation of the nuclear deal between Iran and world powers—Iranian hardliners stormed Saudi diplomatic facilities. Egged on by conservative rivals of moderate then-president Hassan Rouhani (2013-21), the demonstrators were outraged by Riyadh’s execution of a prominent Saudi Shiite dissident cleric. They also shared the Kingdom’s disdain for the nuclear deal. The incidents in Mashhad and Tehran had major regional repercussions.

Saudi Arabia promptly cut ties with the Islamic Republic. Several other Gulf Arab states followed suit in downgrading relations, in solidarity with Riyadh. Over the next five years, there was no improvement in the bilateral relationship. In 2019, an aerial attack claimed by the Houthis, but blamed on Iran, took out much of Saudi oil production. By 2021, as Iran and the US were due to hold presidential elections, it was becoming increasingly clear that a conservative would likely head the next government in Tehran. It also became apparent that a Democrat may retake the White House. So secret talks in Baghdad, hosted by then-Iraqi prime minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi (2020-22), began in the spring of 2021, towards the end of the Rouhani era.

Upon taking office in Aug. 2021, conservative President Raisi immediately emphasized that his foreign policy priorities would differ from that of his moderate predecessor. “I extend a hand of friendship and brotherhood to all countries, especially those in the region,” he said at his inauguration. As Amwaj.media has previously reported, MbS congratulated Raisi on his election and sent him a welcoming message through Kadhimi, expressing an interest in investing in Iran and opening the Kingdom to Iranian companies. Informed sources in the region with knowledge of the message say MbS specified that Saudi investment, if relations were to be fully normalized, could reach up to 20B USD.

Following multiple rounds of talks in Iraq and Oman over 2021 and 2022, Iranian and Saudi officials convened in China in March this year, where they struck a deal to normalize relations. While progress has been incremental, and in some instances far behind schedule—including the reopening of embassies—things have moved forward. The Iranian and Saudi foreign ministers have exchanged visits, though neither of the top diplomats have so far met the respective heads of state.

And more than two years after his message to Raisi, the Saudi crown prince finally met the Iranian president for the first time last month. While the setting was an OIC summit, the meeting signaled that the commitment to improve relations is there. The question is when, and more importantly how, the two sides may advance the process. The US sanctions regime continues to present a formidable obstacle to significant Saudi investment in Iran, and there are no indications that it will be lifted any time soon. 

On the other hand, while Hamas’s attack on Israel was likely partly geared to disrupt the US-backed effort to normalize ties between Riyadh and Tel Aviv, the Kingdom has shown its ability to play a delicate game geared to extract concessions from all sides. Prior to Oct. 7, the most contentious Saudi requests from the US included unprecedented security commitments and the delivery of a nuclear program. Those previously impossible asks may now look a lot more palatable to the Joe Biden administration, particularly given its political struggles both at home and abroad ahead of the Nov. 2024 US presidential elections.

Moreover, as a direct result of the attack on Israel, the indirect talks between Tehran and Washington to revive the nuclear deal and lift sanctions—a key objective of the Islamic Republic—appear to be frozen once again. Where these developments may leave Iran, including in relation to Saudi Arabia, remains to be seen.

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فارسیPersian
فارسیPersian
عربيArabic
عربيArabic