Iraqi Kurdistan has in past months increasingly become an arena for regional states looking to settle scores with exiled dissidents. Iranian and Turkish attacks are no longer limited to the targeting of border regions with artillery, rockets and missiles to root out rebel groups. The strikes have expanded into the Kurdistan region’s skies through Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), which seem to have become Iran and Turkey’s preferred means to liquidate opponents—at low cost, and with the ability to evade responsibility for collateral damage.

The situation has partly been enabled by the absence of air defense systems capable of deterring drones in the semi-autonomous region, which has long been a safe haven for many dissidents and political refugees.

The recent uptick in drone strikes has sparked worry and fear among locals, raising anxieties that UAV operations could impact the future of Iraqi Kurdistan. Earlier this month,  Rizgar Mohammad, a member of the Kurdistan region’s region’s parliament, went as far as stating that he no longer dares to carry any passengers in his car lest it be hit by a UAV, citing the “war of drones.”

Ankara’s strategic choice in Iraq

Turkey has in past months altered its strategy of confrontation with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), its long-time nemesis. Rather than deploying artillery or fighter jets, the Turkish armed forces have become chiefly dependent on drones as the weapon of choice to target members and commanders of the PKK inside Iraq. The shift first came to light in the aftermath of Ankara’s announcement of Operation Claw-Lock in April—the eighth Turkish offensive in the country since 2019. Given that the multiple military offensives have failed to achieve many of their stated aims, Turkey has instead focused its intelligence efforts on locating PKK commanders and positions, for targeting by its drones.

The scale of the UAV operations is significant: between February and mid-October this year, Turkey carried out more than 20 drone attacks on targets in Iraqi Kurdistan. Importantly, the geographic scope of the strikes has also expanded. Unlike the past, Turkish military operations have not been limited to the border governorates of Erbil and Duhok, which are controlled by Ankara’s allies in the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)—an arch-foe of the PKK which implicitly welcomes the attacks. In past months, Turkish drone strikes have expanded to target PKK commanders in Sulaimaniyah Governorate, far away from the border and traditionally a zone of Iranian influence. Of note, Sulaimaniyah is controlled by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which is close to both Tehran and the PKK.

The PKK has repeatedly voiced concerns over Turkey’s attacks and has held the PUK responsible for protecting its members and commanders in Sulaimaniyah Governorate. The PKK has also raised concerns about possible collusion by its Kurdish hosts with Turkish intelligence to facilitate access to its commanders, warning that it may reconsider its ties with the PUK if the Iraqi Kurdish party fails to safeguard senior PKK commanders.

Amwaj.media spoke about the Turkish drone strikes with a security commander from Sulaimaniyah Governorate’s Kalar district—the scene of a drone strike in June which targeted four PKK members. Speaking on condition of anonymity, he stated, “We at the security apparatuses seek to protect all citizens, refugees, and guests who are present in the [Kurdistan] region. We are constantly working to tackle security challenges. However, we are unable to predict when the next attack will take place. We also lack the needed tools to counter these drones and obstruct their access to targets in the [Kurdistan] region.”

The security commander added that Kurdish authorities have “repeatedly asked Turkey and the PKK not to transform their territory into an arena to settle scores.” He elaborated, “We had always called on PKK commanders not to carry out any military activities, such as setting up checkpoints on some roads in the Garmian region. This has undermined the Kurdistan Regional Government’s authority and has given regional states reason to target the [Kurdistan] region.”

Iraqi Kurdish journalist Mahmoud Yassin Al-Kurdi believes that the aim behind Turkey resorting to drone strikes is to “limit its human and military losses and to transfer the battle beyond its borders.” He also charged that the use of UAVs “is somewhat of a military display to show off the Turkish advances in the field of unmanned aircraft with the addition of the facilitated targeting of PKK field commanders.” Kurdi further asserted that “the PKK has lost many field commanders…due to the use of drones. This has led to major changes in the balance of war between the two sides, which seems to be further tilting towards the Turkish side.”

A new destination for Iranian drones

Similar to Turkey, Iran has also succeeded in developing advanced UAV technology. Iranian drones are used in many conflict and war zones from Syria to Lebanon along the Israeli border—and all the way to Ukraine, where Iran is accused of involvement in the war by providing Russia with UAVs.

Against this backdrop, the Kurdistan region of Iraq has emerged as the newest arena for Iran to showcase and deploy its drone capabilities. Iran has in the past attacked the bases of Iranian Kurdish opposition parties in northern Iraq, and earlier this year hit an alleged “Israeli strategic center” in Erbil. However, Tehran’s aerial strikes on Iranian Kurdish dissidents in the area late last month stand out on account of their intensity and scope. Over the course of a full week, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) deployed tens of UAVs to carry out precision strikes.

The Islamic Republic views drones as the optimal method to target dissidents who are based in the Kurdistan region. Iran’s aerial assets can hit targets with utmost accuracy, and do not spark much internal and international reactions. This is not to mention that the drones are easily dispatched and guided over the skies of Iraq in general and the Kurdistan region in particular, especially since the latter is considered as the most suitable environment for UAVs due to the absence of aerial defence and deterrence mechanisms.

Speaking to Amwaj.media, Iraqi Kurdish journalist Kurdi said “the vast distance between Iran and the [Iranian] Kurdish [opposition] parties’ bases in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, especially in the districts of Koy Sanjaq and Qara Dagh, is the key reason why Tehran is using drones. Moreover, these bases only house a few armed members and mostly harbour families and children of fighters. Therefore, these [precision-guided] drones may lessen the possibility of civilian casualties [compared to artillery strikes], rendering them the best choice for Iran to counter these armed movements.”

As the threat posed by Iranian and Turkish UAVs over the skies of Iraqi Kurdistan rises, it has become evident that the region’s cities are no longer a safe environment for commanders of Kurdish opposition groups—all of which have become easy targets for both Ankara and Tehran. This is especially true considering Iraqi authorities’ failure to protect Iraq’s skies and to prevent the transformation of the country into an arena for score-settling by foreign actors.