Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan arrived in Saudi Arabia on Apr. 28 for his first state visit in five years. The trip came on the back of a year-long effort to reset relations. Ties between the two regional players majorly deteriorated following the 2018 murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Kingdom’s consulate in Istanbul.

Turkey’s efforts to hold Khashoggi’s murderers accountable seriously damaged the image of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (MbS)—who is widely believed to have given the assassination order—and isolated him internationally. Yet, despite the Turkish endeavor to shed light on what had unfolded, business largely continued as usual with Saudi Arabia on the global arena, leaving Ankara’s calls for justice unanswered.

Paving the way for a reset

The legal case in Turkey against those involved in the Khashoggi murder was stalled for over a year as the court was unable to take statements from the 26 Saudi defendants being tried in absentia. Last year, Turkish Presidency spokesman Ibrahim Kalin implied that Ankara had exhausted all means to deliver justice and that there was nothing more that it could do. Ultimately, Turkey’s transfer of the murder case to Saudi Arabia in March this year—upon a Saudi request—was among the measures that paved the way for the normalization between the two states. While outraged by the murder, Turkey came to find that it was pursuing a dead-end case overlooked by other actors that were busy re-engaging MbS.

While in Riyadh, Turkey’s president met with King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud and the crown prince. In comparison with Turkish outlets, Saudi media seemed keener on publishing footage of Erdogan and MbS shaking hands and embracing each other. Whereas the warm encounter can be taken as officially signifying the normalization of ties—particularly given that the crown prince is the de facto leader of Saudi Arabia—it holds other messages too. Indeed, it could be argued that a friendly appearance with Erdogan will help MbS repair his damaged image in the Arab and Muslim world.

The real drivers of normalization

Similar to Saudi Arabia, Turkey also aspires to initiate “mutually beneficial” political, military, economic, and cultural cooperation, as stated by Erdogan. Yet many observers hold the belief that the normalization is almost exclusively driven by Turkey’s economic hardships and Riyadh’s unofficial boycott of Turkish exports.

Ali Shihabi, a Saudi analyst with close ties to decision makers in Riyadh, has stated that “Erdogan was isolated and paid a high economic price in massive economic losses resulting from an economic and travel boycott, which is why he is the one coming to Saudi Arabia.” Echoing this narrative, Dina Esfandiary of the International Crisis Group is of the opinion that Turkish economic interests are “a major, major driver” of the visit. This narrative is not confined to a few observers but is rather the dominant—and unchallenged—discourse widely promoted by analysts, experts, and media.

However, viewing the normalization between Ankara and Riyadh as a one-way process—and overemphasizing economic factors as the key driver—reflects at best a distorted understanding of the dynamics at play. Indeed, available data show that Turkey’s trade with Saudi Arabia has been modest, and in some respects even negligible relative to the size of the Turkish economy. This does not only apply to the present, but was also the case in 2015-16, when ties between the two regional powerhouses were at their apex.

The reality is that the volume of annual bilateral trade between Turkey and Saudi Arabia has not surpassed 5.8B USD at any point, or a mere 1.5% of Turkish international trade exchanges. With the unofficial Saudi boycott of Turkish exports that was initiated in 2020, trade stood at over 3.5B USD last year.

In terms of foreign direct investment, inflows from Saudi Arabia—peaking as far back as 2008—have constituted barely 1% of the total that Turkey received through 2005-21.

Moreover, in terms of tourism—a vital component of the Turkish economy—Saudi Arabia has not been a significant contributor. When the number of Saudi arrivals peaked at almost 750,000 in 2018, they constituted less than 2% of the foreign tourists who visited Turkey that year.

In other words, while there is no doubt that Turkey’s economy is struggling, Erdogan is unlikely to be uniquely motivated by economic factors in his pursuit of normalization with Saudi Arabia. Rather geopolitical and geostrategic factors have the upper hand in shaping the bilateral relationship.

These dynamics have been evident over the past decade, which has seen Saudi Arabia and Turkey drawn closer to each other—or turning distant—chiefly under the influence of political rather than economic parameters. In particular, their ties have been greatly shaped by the regional policies of the United States and Iran as well as the security repercussions of these policies. Since 2017, the equation has become further complex with the addition of MbS’s increasing influence over Saudi foreign policy as a new and powerful factor.

Gaming the trajectory of ties

The dominant geopolitical and geostrategic parameters of the Saudi-Turkish relationship as well as the lack of a complex economic interdependency suggest that it is too early to celebrate the reconciliation—let alone envisage the trajectory of relations over the coming years.

While Turkey and Saudi Arabia might achieve some progress in elevating their ties, their relationship remains fragile and susceptible to many variables.

First, Saudi-Turkish relations are not very institutionalized. This means that the normalization will be highly dependent on the personal relationship between Erdogan and MbS. According to one unnamed Saudi official, “He [Erdogan] needs us more than we need him, and he’s the one traveling to us. This stance of his has cost him billions in lost revenues. Any trade will be on our terms.” If these words are taken to represent the general mood in Riyadh, then it could be argued that the broader and more substantial dynamics at play are not well understood in Saudi Arabia. If anything, such a parochial attitude only implies that the reconciliation might not be sustainable.

Second, contrary to the normalization processes between Turkey and other regional states such as Egypt, Israel and the United Arab Emirates, there is no concrete agenda on the economic nor on the political and intelligence levels between Ankara and Riyadh. The existence of such an agenda would be a good indicator of where the bilateral relationship may be heading.

Third, the regional and international dynamics that have led to the Saudi-Turkish normalization at the current stage are not constant. Possible shifts in these dynamics may thus affect the bilateral relationship. The factors worthy of closer observation include Turkey’s 2023 general and presidential elections, the 2024 US presidential polls, the fate of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, and the internal situation in Saudi Arabia amid the Kingdom’s leadership transition.

Ultimately, regardless of the genuineness of the will for reconciliation, the normalization between Saudi Arabia and Turkey stands on shaky grounds, and can be subject to volatile changes. The only thing that is certain is that the resilience of the reconciliation will be tested in the coming period.