Turkey and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states appear to be filling the void in Syria as Iran’s influence after the fall of Bashar Al-Assad dramatically diminishes. Ankara’s coordination with Gulf Arab capitals stands to bring about growing alignment. Turkey has gone to pains to accommodate the interests of all GCC states in the new Syria, including those which previously saw the foreign policy of Turkey’s “neo-Islamist” government as a threat.

In particular, Saudi Arabia—the GCC state taking the lead on shoring up and legitimizing the administration of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) on an international level—shares many of Turkey’s interests. These include helping Syria achieve a smooth transition, preserve its territorial integrity, and not become a haven for violent extremist groups that threaten other countries.

A cooperative approach

“While Turkey could have chosen to act alone and benefit from its advantageous position in Syria thanks to its influence with Syria’s new rulers, it opted to engage all regional actors with the new administration and invited them to invest in Syria’s future,” Dr. Pinar Dost, a Non-Resident Fellow at the Atlantic Council and an Associate Researcher with the French Institute for Anatolian Studies, told Amwaj.media.

“Turkey, aware of their concerns regarding the return of political Islam to Arab lands…paid particular attention to bringing in the Gulf countries, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and…pursued active diplomacy with both the new leaders of Syria as well as with the Gulf countries,” she added.

Saudi-Turkish cooperation on post-Assad Syria needs to be understood within the wider context of Ankara and Riyadh’s rapprochement, which began gaining momentum at the start of this decade and has strengthened since. To their credit, the two sides have proven capable of moving past issues that fueled friction in bilateral affairs during the 2010s, such as the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, the 2013 coup in Egypt, the Libyan civil war, and the blockade of Qatar. Policymakers in Ankara seem to recognize the importance of working with the Kingdom to achieve stability as Syria’s delicate transition progresses. While seeking to serve as the new primary security partner of Damascus, the chances of Turkish success on that front will increase if the Saudi role in Syria complements that of Ankara.

“Turkey needs support from the GCC, and particularly Saudi Arabia in realizing these goals, which points to alignment in the form of jointly investing in the HTS-led government,” Batu Coşkun, a political analyst who specializes in Turkish affairs at the Sadeq Institute, told Amwaj.media.

“Turkey, given its longstanding historical, cultural, and geographical ties to Syria, and Saudi Arabia, with its economic and institutional resources, both share a primary goal of ensuring Syrian territorial integrity and restoring stability. These overlapping interests have set the stage for a potential deepening of Turkish-Saudi relations in the aftermath of Assad’s departure,” Gökhan Ereli, the Gulf Studies Coordinator at the Ankara-based ORSAM think tank, told Amwaj.media.

The two regional powerhouses also see eye-to-eye on western sanctions on post-Assad Syria, which Saudi Arabia and Turkey have strongly opposed. With Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman and the Saudi lobby in Washington having significant influence with US President Donald Trump, Ankara knows that Riyadh can help persuade the White House to lift restrictions and end the designation of HTS as a terrorist organization.

Israeli actions against post-Assad Syria also bring Saudi Arabia and Turkey closer. Officials in Ankara and Riyadh have used strong language to condemn Tel Aviv’s territorial encroachment and military aggression since Assad’s fall, viewing this conduct as destabilizing and threatening Syria’s transition.

“[Ankara and Riyadh] both can agree that an Israeli occupation is unacceptable and would feed separatism, radicalism, and terrorism and could further complicate the issue if it remains in Syria's lands in the future. I believe both [Turkey and Saudi Arabia] concur on these objectives,” Dr. Ali Bakir, Assistant Professor at Qatar University and Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and Middle East Programs, told Amwaj.media.

Grounds for friction

Although Saudi and Turkish policies towards post-Assad Syria appear closely aligned, experts agree that friction could later arise.

“Competition over who wields greater influence in shaping the country’s political and economic structures may surface, especially as both Turkey and Saudi Arabia wish to bolster their roles in post-Assad governance. Additionally, if their broader regional strategies or alliances diverge—as they have at times in the past—disagreements may arise over priorities, the choice of local partners, or the pace of reforms,” Ereli told Amwaj.media. 

“Turkey’s immediate concerns, such as border security and the return of Syrian refugees, may not always perfectly align with Saudi Arabia’s economic and prestige-focused approach. These differences, if not carefully managed, could create tensions that might hamper sustained cooperation in the evolving context of the ‘New Syria,’” he added.

If Gulf Arab capitals begin to perceive Syria’s new government as a Turkish client state, or an Islamist regime committed to exporting revolution, the Kingdom could begin to view Ankara’s role in post-Assad Syria with suspicion. Under such circumstances, Saudi Arabia might seek to work with other Arab states to pull Syria back to the Arab fold and away from Turkey’s orbit of influence—similar to how some GCC states put much effort into trying to lure Assad’s Syria away from Iran.

Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are, at least for now, not seeking to challenge each other in Syria. Pointing to a shared desire to “support Syria's transition for the sake of regional stability,” Anna Jacobs, Non-Resident Fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, told Amwaj.media that “at present, there are more overlapping interests, rather than divergent ones.”

Looking ahead

Importantly, this is not a time in which Turkey believes it can afford to clash with Saudi Arabia in the new Syria, largely because of how much Ankara will be needing Riyadh to play a role in the war-torn country that is conducive to Turkish interests.

“Turkey seems to be interested in limiting friction with Saudi Arabia as it moves to expand influence in Syria. This is clear from the high level of engagement between officials and Turkey seeking to form a regional cohort in support of the new government. Turkey cannot support Syria without financial support from the GCC,” noted Coşkun.

Considering that some actors may have interests in preventing close Saudi-Turkish alignment, Dr. Bakir argues that one must “recognize that there are many moving parts, and both [Ankara and Riyadh] should remain vigilant against attempts by different regional and international players to sow divisions, encourage friction between them, or promote negative competition under various pretexts.”

Ultimately, post-Assad Syria can do much to help bring Saudi Arabia and Turkey together—despite Syria having been a source of tension between the two regional heavyweights in the past. In the view of Dr. Dost, after successfully setting aside past differences to establish cooperative ties in strategic areas such as defense, Ankara and Riyadh can now “form the backbone of security and stability in the Middle East to the extent that they can watch out for each other's expectations and needs.”

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