Aug. 10, 2023

Interview transcript: An Emirati perspective of Iran

Peninsula/Politics

To understand the shifts in the Emirati-Iranian relationship, and how they fit into the greater changes in the region and the world, Amwaj.media sat down with prominent Emirati academic Dr. Abdulkhaleq Abdulla. A Professor of Political Science from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Dr. Abdulla is also a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at Harvard University. The following is a full transcript of the interview.

A writeup of the interview can be read here.

 

The Iran-UAE relationship has changed a lot over the past decade. The UAE is no longer the Iranian economy's window to the world, and political ties are also very different. How would you describe the current relationship?

Iran and the UAE went through a very tough period over the past 10 years. They were at each other's throat in several places, Yemen being one of them. And, when the sanctions and the notion that you need to use the stick and stand up to Iran came with the [Donald] Trump administration (2017-21), the UAE probably welcomed that. As a result, the economic relationship was profoundly affected. Trade went from 20B USD to something like maybe 11-12B USD a year.

I think the two sides have learned the lesson and found that the time has come to stop the political confrontation. Over the past two years, the UAE has reached out to Iran. [National Security Advisor Sheikh] Tahnoon [bin Zayed Al Nahyan] has gone to meet with Iranian officials in Tehran, and we have completely reversed the slide into rivalries. There are a lot of conversations going on between the two countries, trade is back to almost where it was, and the plan is to head into 25-30B USD a year in the near future. So, we are probably not only back to where we were, but even better today.

 

What produced this shift in Emirati thinking?

Three different factors can explain [the change]. Covid-19 was a time for the UAE to reflect on the net result of 10 years of active foreign policy and confrontation with Iran and rethink some of its priorities. As a result, they set up priorities for the 10 years to come. And one of those priorities was to withdraw from any kind of confrontation with Iran and try to reach out to all adversaries; Iran, Turkey, Syria, Israel, etc. So, 2019 was a trigger year for the UAE and the pandemic probably helped it sit down and rethink what had happened.

Second, the region was in turmoil during the Arab Spring revolution period. Things were difficult all over the place, in Yemen, Syria, Libya, Iraq, etc. There was a lot of confusion…and the main target was to try to confront forces of chaos. By 2019, I think the UAE, Saudi Arabia and the moderate camp came to the realization that the fight has almost come to an end; that the forces of chaos—Daesh [Islamic State group] and the Muslim Brotherhood etc.—have been more or less defeated, but not totally. Thus, the UAE took the lead in de-escalation…and reached out to Iran and Turkey and all other adversaries.

2019 was also when the Trump administration was coming to an end, and we had [the rise of Joe] Biden and that accelerated this whole regional and domestic thinking on calm and less volatility.

 

Did any aspect of US behavior impact the Emirati rethink?

When Biden entered office, he wanted to undo everything Trump had done…so that was a refreshing restart. One of the things that Trump did was to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and increase pressure on Iran…the Biden administration came with a different package…it was a welcome thing because it corresponded nicely with the way UAE was rethinking regional policy.

 

The UAE invited the Iranian president for a visit. The apparent Iranian response was that diplomatic ties first need to be normalized and that a formal, official invitation is vital. Those conditions have now been met. What is holding back a presidential visit by either side?

Two or three things are slowing down the process. First, when the [Emirati] invitation was [first] extended in 2019, there was an uprising in Iran…so, it was not very fitting for any high-level exchange while it was going on. We just had to wait and see how it would go. The unrest was more militant and there were a lot of questions about where the end would be.

Second, the UAE was also expecting that the Iranians would stop provocative maneuvers and tone down threats against international maritime [shipping] in the Gulf and close to our waters. But the Iranians just kept on targeting some of these oil tankers and they did not respond [to complaints]. And it would have been very difficult to see more of an opening while the Iranians were not giving anything…so, I think it was a bit of a letdown.

Finally, things are also hung up over protocol; who visits who first? These things sometimes take time to sort out. Is it [Iranian President] Raisi coming first or is it [UAE President Sheikh] Mohammad bin Zayed [Al Nahyan] (MbZ) going first?

 

When MbZ traveled to Turkey in Nov. 2021, he had a major package of incentives with him. His visit was also preceded by multiple exchanges led by his national security advisor. There appears to be a similar pattern in Iran. Given the apparent role of Sheikh Tahnoon in paving the way for rapprochement and his prior engagement with Mr. [Ali] Shamkhani, do you see any impact of the replacement of Shamkhani? Will things be different with Mr. [Alireza] Ahmadian as the Iranian counterpart?

It has been very difficult to deal with Iran since 1979 because you don't know who the person you talk to really is. Sometimes you talk to the foreign minister, and it turns out that he is not the right person to speak with because there are others who make the decision, and this has happened time and again. On our side, things are very clear. When our official comes and promises something, you had better believe 100% that the UAE will deliver.

The change of personalities in Iran is also not very settling. You deal with one person, and all of a sudden in four years you have a different person with a different political and ideological orientation, going from one stream to the other—from Reformist to more radical. So yes, personalities have been a tricky issue; Is [Hossein Amir-] Abdollahian today the person that can deliver? We're not so sure. But we are talking to him. He is officially the Minister of Foreign Affairs…but you know how much he could reach out to the real decision maker.

As for Shamkhani, we thought for a while that he was the right person [to deal with] because he has been around for a long time, he is very close to the supreme leader and the inner circle of the decision making. All of a sudden, after dealing with him on so many grounds and forging good personal relations—which matter a lot—all of a sudden, he is now gone. There is a new individual in his place. Nobody knows much about him; we have not met him yet. So, personalities matter a lot and sometimes…the relationship could progress and sometimes suffers a setback purely on [the basis of] these personal levels.

We still have to find out who the real people we need to talk to are. And I think there is room for another visit maybe, from our side, or from Iran’s side. Maybe the new individual, Ahmadian, should come and visit the UAE or maybe he should extend an invitation to our national security advisor.

 

There is a lot of talk about Iran-US de-escalation efforts. Is there a role for the UAE in such a setting? 

Everybody is active in trying to bring Iran and the US to [the table to] talk…the UAE will be more than happy to mediate to reduce this tension, because the course of action for the next 10 years is to de-escalate tension. But then Oman is there, Qatar is there, so everybody is there [in that mediator setting].

The UAE has already hosted one of the JCPOA meetings between the Iranians and the Europeans. And I think that is just one indication of maybe a role that the UAE can play. I'm not sure what else the UAE can do at this stage, because there are so many other actors. But from a UAE perspective, the Iranians are hung up on being targeted by the Americans…it is very difficult to come up with any substantial improvement in the relationship for as long as the Iranians still view America in such a big threatening role, except deals such as the JCPOA which sometimes come up.

From the UAE perspective, what would help a lot is not just de-escalation on the regional level, but also de-escalation of the threat discourse that we have heard from Iran.

The Iranians have been making things difficult because of the threat narrative against oil tankers and freedom of navigation. If the Iranians really want to improve relationships, maybe they should just try to work on the threat discourse; the lesser the better. And I think that would be the best way to improve relationships, because narratives mean a lot.

 

What is the Emirati perspective of the Iranian-Saudi normalization effort? Do you think the UAE can play a role in helping facilitate the undertaking?

If there is any space for making this deal stick, the UAE will of course be happy to help. And I think everybody is happy to see this reduction of tensions between Riyadh and Tehran because of their regional status. I think it helps to make the Gulf [region] more relaxed.

But over the past 40 years, every time Riyadh and Tehran have moved to de-escalate, an incident—at the Haj [pilgrimage] or with the storming of the [Saudi] embassy—has acted as a spoiler.

So we have to watch out for little and unexpected things, because every time these two countries try to work together, and they did so in the past under [Akbar Hashemi] Rafsanjani (1989-97), [Hassan] Rouhani (2013-21), and so many others—and even [Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad (2005-13) by the way—one incident spoiled everything and set back the good relationship that everybody sought.

So, let's make sure that we do not go through that kind of bad experience [again]. We had one risk [incident] during the recent Haj, and I think they are not making a big fuss of it, but it could spoil years of good negotiations between Riyadh and Tehran.

 

The Iranian-Saudi rapprochement relies on practical dividends. Do you think the UAE can play a role in facilitating the realization of some of these dividends?

When Iran and Saudi Arabia signed the deal in Beijing [in Mar. 2023], one thing we heard loud and clear was the Saudi foreign minister promising immediate investment in Iran. So, it seems that there is readiness in terms of investing in Iran, from Saudi Arabia and not just from the UAE.

I'm not sure that there has been any follow-up, but it all depends on Iran. It takes two to tango. I think the Saudis are looking at every [Iranian] action, every level of threat, every provocative move, changes of personalities, etc.

And Iran is not your best place to invest in. Turkey is much more stable. They had a new election; we know that [Recep Tayyip] Erdogan is going to be there for the next five years. So, the UAE came with a 30B USD investment. Do you think the UAE will go into Iran with that kind of massive investment? As long as Iran is in this kind of confusion and unstable, it is not a very conducive place for investment for the Saudis, for the UAE, and for the Gulf.

We would love to invest more in Iran; it is a huge economy with a potential. But they need to sort out a lot of things inside [their country] before they ask the Saudis to come with that kind of money, or the UAE to come with five or ten billion, let alone 30B USD.

I think we would be happy—be it the UAE, Saudi Arabia, or other Gulf countries—to invest in Iran because it is the closest [country] and maybe that kind of investment will reduce Iran being a headache to us and a threat to Gulf security. But the Iranians have to do their homework and they have not yet done so.

 

With the geopolitical shifts produced by the Russia-Ukraine war, the International North-South Transport Corridor—connecting Russia with Asia via Iran—is on the agenda. Is there any UAE appetite for investment in transit in Iran?

At present, there is zero appetite for that kind of huge investment in the infrastructure, and…I don't think Saudi Arabia, Qatar or whoever…are going to be very keen to go through with it either.

Iran is not as stable, and Russia is still bogged down with Ukraine. And we’re not in the habit of getting the Americans angry, by helping with that kind of opening. So, I see zero chance for that [kind of investment] to advance, at least in the near future.

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