Aug. 25, 2022

Is Sadr’s call for ‘revolution’ in Iraq bringing Iran, US closer?

Iraq/Politics

The story: Sadrist Movement leader, Muqtada Al-Sadr, is seemingly dismissing US pressure to engage with other key players to resolve the political deadlock in Iraq. This comes as Tehran and Washington increasingly appear to share common ground in their view of the necessity for dialogue to result in a new government in Baghdad.

The details: Iraq’s President Barham Salih received US Ambassador to Iraq Alina Romanowski in Baghdad on Aug. 24. The two sides discussed “easing tensions in the region through dialogue,” among other topics.

  • The day before, on Aug. 23, the US embassy in Baghdad urged all parties to “resolve any political differences through a peaceful process guided by the Iraqi constitution.” It also called on protesters to “respect the proceedings and property of Iraq’s governmental institutions,” in an implicit reference to the Sadrists.

  • Earlier on Aug. 23, Iraq’s supreme judicial council announced the effective shutdown of the judiciary in reaction to the expansion of a Sadrist protest outside its headquarters. The council has since reversed its decision after Sadr ordered his supporters to withdraw.

Hours after the meeting between Romanowski and Salih, a Twitter account associated with Sadr took an implicit jab at the US.

  • The account tweeted on Aug. 24 that the Sadrists have dismissed “international pressures” to engage in “dialogue with the corrupt.” It further characterized the deflection of the pressure for talks as a win, charging that foreign actors “have been forced to [accept] that it will not materialize.”

Only days earlier, on Aug.19, the same Twitter account accused Sadr’s rivals in the Iran-backed Shiite Coordination Framework of having “entered [Iraq] with US tanks,” referring to the 2003 American-led invasion. It also alleged that in comparison to Sadr, the Coordination Framework is “closer to eastern [Iranian] and western [US] agendas.”

  • Most Coordination Framework leaders were in exile in Arab countries, Iran and the west during the Saddam Hussein era (1979-2003) whereas Sadr remained in Iraq.

The Iranian and US dimensions: The relationship between Sadr and the US has been highly contentious since the American-led invasion of Iraq almost two decades ago.

  • Three months after the launch of the invasion, in June 2003, Sadr organized his armed supporters into the Mahdi Army. The following year, in Apr. 2004, he ordered the Mahdi Army to commence attacks on the US occupation. In 2014, the Mahdi Army was renamed as Saraya Al-Salam (The Peace Brigades).

  • Sadr has from the outset also been opposed to the political system set up after 2003. He “renounced” the new constitution that was adopted in 2005, since it was authored during the US occupation and implied an ethno-sectarian apportionment system. Of note, he also warned that the constitution’s provisions would be “exploited by the [US] occupier to divide the country.”

On the other hand, Sadr has also had a troubled relationship with neighboring Iran, which is also home to a majority Shiite Muslim population.

  • Sadr routinely adopts discourse hostile to any external interference in Iraq, including interventions by Iran. Yet, in 2007, he went into self-imposed 4-year exile in Iran, where he continued his theological studies at the seminary in Qom. He also maintains high-level contacts with the Islamic Republic, including with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

  • Of further note, in an Aug. 14 interview with Amwaj.media, top Sadrist aide Dhiaa Al-Asadi recalled hearing Sadr assert that he would “fight the Americans if they wage a war against Iran from Iraq.” Asadi also asserted that Sadr “would never betray his father’s religious edicts,” which stated that it is “haram” [religiously impermissible] to “weaken the Iranian state.”

The bigger picture is that the US has no interest in the collapse of the political system set up under its previous occupation to replace Saddam Hussein's rule. Iran, on the other hand, neither seeks an end to a political establishment dominated by its allies.

The current Iraqi context: The Sadrist Movement became the single largest bloc in Iraq’s Oct. 2021 parliamentary elections. In the aftermath of the polls, Sadr sought to break the post-2003 norm of forming a consensus cabinet with all political forces represented. Instead, he attempted to establish a “national majority government” along with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Sunni blocs. That would have sidelined the Iran-backed Coordination Framework from power.

  • After almost 10 months of failed efforts to set up a “national majority government,” Sadr ordered his lawmakers to resign from the parliament in June—giving the Coordination Framework the opportunity to attempt to form Iraq’s next government.
  • However, on July 30, on the day the Coordination Framework sought to hold a parliamentary session to push for its prime minister candidate, Sadrists stormed the legislature. The parliament has been shut down ever since.

  • In the aftermath of the Sadrist storming of Baghdad’s Green Zone, Sadr has called for a “revolution”—demanding the dissolution of the parliament, early elections, and reforms to the 2005 constitution.

The future: At least so far, there are no signs of Sadr backtracking on his demands. Instead, he appears to be sticking to continued escalation of street politics. In addition to crippling the parliament, he is also taking aim at the judiciary—accusing it of acting as a tool of his political rivals.

  • Meanwhile, Iran’s allies in the Coordination Framework’s calls for dialogue and adherence to constitutional provisions seem to be increasingly in sync with the stance of the US.
  • Despite their differences over other dossiers, Iran and the US largely appear to find themselves on the same page in Iraq. Both sides want to maintain the political system in the country. Such a trend would be in line with past Iran-US consensus on government formation in Iraq—even though Tehran and Washington are far from allies.
Amwaj.media
Amwaj.media
Amwaj.media
فارسیPersian
فارسیPersian
عربيArabic
عربيArabic